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the domestic – international nexus
GERALD CHAN, PAK K LEE & LAI-HA CHAN
ABSTRACT This paper examines the connection between China’s domestic
governance and its involvement in global governance in environmental
protection by studying the major actors and issues involved in the interaction
between the domestic and international spheres of activities. These actors
include international institutions, national and local governments, nongovern-
mental organisations, and others. The paper demonstrates that China has made
some substantive progress in protecting its environment, but much more needs to
be done. Internationally it seems to lack the will or the capability to make much
contribution towards global environmental governance. However, because of its
huge aggregate size, what it does or does not do to avert environmental
degradation at home could have a significant impact on collective efforts to
protect the environment at the global level.
Much has been said about China’s environmental woes as well as its
international environmental policy,1 but little attention seems to have been
paid to the interplay between the domestic and the international side of
China’s environmental governance.2 This phenomenon is intriguing given
that China’s huge population size means that a fifth of humankind suffers
from serious environmental damage, a situation which should have
commanded the attention of the global community. What is China’s
participation in global environmental governance? What is the linkage
between China’s domestic environmental governance and its international
environmental governance? How do they mirror each other with respect to
China’s concerns for environmental protection? As a rising power desiring to
be seen as a responsible member of the international community, has China
done enough to comply with the international rules and norms that govern
environmental protection? In what way has it contributed to the governance
of the global environmental commons? Does it aspire to do so? Is it capable
of doing so? To answer these and other related questions, this article
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proposes to look at China from the inside out as well as from the outside in in
order to map out the domestic – international linkage.
China realises that it stands to benefit from taking domestic initiatives and
in joining international efforts to clean up its polluted environment, in so far
as its political authorities are not severely compromised. China can be
expected to co-operate more fully with international environmental regimes
than with other types of global regimes, as it has come to realise, albeit
belatedly, that proper environmental protection constitutes an important
part of its overall development. Also, the central government is more tolerant
of domestic environmental NGOs than of NGOs working in areas such as
human rights and infectious diseases.
Chinese leaders seem to think that if the country can clean up its own
environmental act, it will be making a significant contribution to the
international effort to combat global environmental issues. Indeed, China’s
environmental protection, or the lack of it, has exerted a significant impact
on the environments of its neighbours. Air carrying a high concentration of
sulphur dioxide from the burning of coal has spread from mainland China to
Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, the west coast of the USA and Canada,3
bringing with it acid rain, and as far as New Zealand, a far corner to the
south of many industrial centres.4 China’s heavily toxic rivers have caused
pollution problems not only in the country itself, but also for the lakes of
neighbouring countries in Central Asia. The hydroelectric dams in its
southwest Yunnan province have severely affected the people living down-
stream of the Mekong River in Laos, Thailand, Burma and Vietnam.5 China
has surpassed the USA as the largest carbon dioxide emitter in the world,6 as
it consumes a lot of hydrocarbon resources such as crude oil and coal. It is
the second largest crude oil consumer after the USA and the third largest
crude oil importer after the USA and Japan, consuming 350 million tonnes
and importing 146 million tonnes in 2006 alone.7 Also, it is the largest
importer of tropical rainforest timber in the world, consuming about 50% of
the world’s annual output.8
The sheer aggregate size of China and its increasing integration with the
rest of the world mean that what China does or does not do in the
environmental field will increasingly exert a global impact. China has, to all
intents and purposes, become an integral part of the world. If China enjoys a
clean environment, then all will stand to benefit. This line of thinking
suggests an intimate relationship between China’s ecology and the global
ecology, and between China’s domestic governance and its global governance
in environmental matters.
China’s environmental involvement can be scrutinised at the international,
regional and domestic levels. The main Chinese actors involved include the
State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and other central and
local government agencies, green NGOs, and some environmentally concerned
individuals. The functions of these actors will be discussed in the following
assessments of China’s global and domestic environmental governance,
followed by the domestic impact on the global scene and then vice versa.






























Assessing China’s global environment governance
China’s environmental governance at the global level can be gauged from
three related areas of activities: agenda setting, rule negotiations and rule
compliance. In terms of agenda setting, China’s contribution to international
environmental programmes seems small, as it is still in a relatively early stage
of learning from others about international diplomacy in general and
international environmental protection in particular, although its engage-
ment with global environmental governance can be dated back to the early
1970s, shortly after China’s accession to the United Nations in late 1971. In
1972, at the close of the Cultural Revolution, PRC officials attended the UN
Conference on Human Environment held in Stockholm. Since then China’s
level of participation in international environmental diplomacy remained low
until its adoption of a reform and opening-up policy. Its contributions to
these international conferences have been confined to the making of general
statements about its view of the world or to the signing of international
treaties. As of 2005, 253 out of 288 (or 88%) international treaties and
conventions of various kinds, including those on the environment, which the
country has signed or ratified since its establishment in 1949, have been done
after 1978.9 China has entered into some 50 international environmental
treaties (see Figure 1).10
China’s green NGOs started to participate in international environmental
conferences in 2002, when delegates from dozens of Chinese green NGOs,
supported by external funds, attended the World Conference on Sustainable
FIGURE 1. Chinese accession to environmental treaties, 1972 – 1997 (cumulative
sum). Sources: Cai & Voigts, quoted in Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘China and
international environmental institutions: a decision rule analysis’, in Michael B
McElroy et al (eds), Energizing China: Reconciling Environmental Protection and
Economic Growth, Harvard University Committee on Environment, Cambridge,
MA, 1998; and China Environmental Protection—Environmental Treaties, at http://































Development held in Johannesburg. There Chinese NGO delegates were said
to be rather quiet, to a large extent reflecting their inexperience in
international conferencing and their lack of confidence. Chinese NGOs’
learning process is expected to gather pace, as many delegates have brought
home useful information and have subsequently turned some of what they
learned at these international gatherings into work programmes for domestic
implementation. Some of these NGOs have continued to keep in contact with
their overseas counterparts. In October 2002 the Global Environment
Facility (GEF)—the designated financial mechanism for international
agreements on biodiversity, climate change and persistent organic pollu-
tants—held its second general assembly in Beijing. Some 40 Chinese NGOs
joined overseas NGO representatives in a forum organised by Friends of
Nature, a prominent Chinese green NGO. In November 2005 an international
conference on renewable energy was held in Beijing, and Chinese NGOs were
active in a parallel nongovernmental forum. (We shall return to the activities
of these NGOs later.)
Information about China’s involvement in international rule negotiations
is sketchy. However, with Japan and South Korea, the country has set up
regular meetings for environment ministers to discuss issues of common
concern, such as air pollution and sandstorms. China has also entered into
similar discussions with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
It has begun negotiating with the European Union to broaden an existing
economic and commercial treaty to include the environment. In addition, it
has joined the US initiative to form an Asian Pacific Partnership involving
four other countries11—Australia,12 Japan, South Korea and India—to
develop technology to control environmental pollution, as a way to
complement the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. (Together these six countries account
for half of the world’s emissions of greenhouse gases.) The USA and Brazil
have recently formed an International Biofuel Forum to explore the
possibilities of wider use of biofuels, including ethanol derived from sugar
cane and corn. Together with India, South Africa and the EU China is a
party to the forum. China is also a dialogue partner of the Group of Eight
industrialised nations, which has in recent years put climate change high on
the agenda. Speaking in a meeting of environment ministers of the G8
together with five key developing countries, including China, in Potsdam in
mid-March 2007, China’s former environment chief, Xie Zhenhua, was non-
committal as to what China would do to cut greenhouse gases after 2012. He
said that the success of the current protocol’s targets needed to be evaluated
and assessed before a successor agreement could be made.13 Apart from these
activities, China has also entered into numerous multilateral and bilateral
discussions on environmental co-operation.
As the world’s top greenhouse gas emitters, as well as its top energy users,
both the USA and China recognise the importance of their relationship not
only to themselves but also to the rest of the world. Increasingly high-level
discussions—bilateral or multilateral, formal or informal, regularised or
occasional—have taken place in recent years in areas of economic
co-operation, energy use and environmental protection.14






























In terms of rule compliance China has committed to comply with the terms
and conditions of some 50 international environmental treaties that it has
signed or ratified, to observe the relevant international environmental
standards, and to take measures to halt environmental degradation. In 1994
the country adopted Agenda 21, a comprehensive programme of environ-
mental-protection activities first proposed at the UN Conference on the
Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. It has also
passed much domestic legislation to protect its environment and to enhance
the strength and punitive power of its environmental agency, SEPA (to be
discussed further in the next section).
It would be difficult to make an accurate assessment of the compliance of
any country with international environmental law, as the meaning of
compliance is controversial, environmental norms and mechanisms are
diverse and lack co-ordination,15 and because most international environ-
ment treaties do not have a robust system of monitoring and enforcement to
make compliance effective. An exception to this general situation is the
Kyoto Protocol. Despite its relatively short, controversial history, the
Protocol offers a basis for making a preliminary assessment. China is
exempted from cutting down its emissions of greenhouse gases because of its
developmental state, under the principle of ‘common but differentiated
responsibility’, which allows developing countries to catch up. The work of
the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Environment
Programme (UNEP) is important in raising China’s environmental awareness
and standards, but these bodies take on an advisory and supportive role
rather than a judicial role and they work under very tight budgets.16 In
addition, UNEP has a narrow mandate and a small staff size, and its work is
often hampered by rivalry between the developed world and the developing
world.
China and the Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol is the most stringent environmental treaty so far
established because of its formal legal requirements of signatory states to
abide by its rules, under penalty, to cut back their emissions of greenhouse
gases. China signed and ratified it in May 1998 and August 2002,
respectively. An examination of China’s relationship with the Kyoto
Protocol serves as an important signpost of its engagement with global
environmental governance.
Because of its developing status, China is at present exempt from the
Protocol’s legal requirements to cut down its emissions of greenhouse gases,
including carbon dioxide, methane, chlorofluorocarbons and other gases.17
Two options seem to be open to China to deal with air pollution. One is to
trade its carbon credits with industrialised nations and industries. The other
is to adopt measures to cut down its own emission of greenhouse gases.
China’s factories and power stations are predicted to churn out 4.6 billion
tonnes of carbon dioxide in 2010, even before accounting for vehicle































this situation provides a market for carbon trade. The Protocol, ratified by
164 countries, requires 35 participating industrial nations to reduce emissions
of carbon dioxide and five other greenhouse gases by 5.2% below 1990 levels
between 2008 and 2012. In order to emit more than their quota allowance
while reducing the global amount of emissions, polluters in developed
countries can buy Certified Emission Reduction credits traded under the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) from companies in developing
countries in which the former have invested in emissions reduction projects.
While the European Union is the largest buyer in the market, China
continues to dominate the selling of carbon credits with its 60% share in
2006, down from 73% a year earlier.19 By October 2006 China has approved
125 projects under the scheme and it is expected to cut industrial emissions by
630 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent by 2012, the cut off date of
the first phase of the Protocol.20
As 2012 approaches, heavy emitting industries in the West are keen to buy
carbon credits to hit the target cut and yet maintain industrial production.
The largest trading so far involves the World Bank and 11 utilities, banks,
trading firms and others on the one hand and two Chinese chemical
companies in Jiangsu province on the other,21 amounting to $1 billion. The
Chinese government is expected to reap a windfall from this trading, through
taxes on the two companies, amounting to 65% of the money involved. The
money will be put into a new Clean Development Fund that China will use to
promote forms of renewable energy. About 75% of the money comes from
European and Asian corporations.22
In early 2007 China and the United Nations set up a carbon trading
exchange in Beijing, which would be the first such exchange to be set up in the
developing world, in competition with private sector carbon exchanges
established in Europe and the USA. As a large emitter of greenhouse gases
not legally obliged to cut such an emission, China offers a lucrative market in
carbon credits. According to the World Bank, about $3 billion in carbon
credits from developing countries were traded in the first nine months of
2006.23
All these activities are new experiences for China’s government, industries
and environmentalists. Many details are in the process of being worked out,
such as how the country will set the total amount of emissions, distribute the
quotas, and determine the prices.24 These experiences may, however, prove to
be useful to other countries, international organisations and environmental
groups for managing global and domestic environmental governance.
Assessing China’s domestic environmental governance
Since 1949 the National People’s Congress has formulated nine laws on
environmental protection and 15 laws on the protection of natural
resources.25 And since 1996 the State Council has formulated or revised
over 50 administrative regulations relating to environmental protection. By
the end of 2005 the country had promulgated over 800 national environ-
mental protection standards and 30 local standards, dealt with over 75 000






























cases of environmental law violations, and closed down 16 000 enterprises
discharging pollutants against the law.26 There are now 3226 environmental
protection administration departments at various levels all over the country,
with 167 000 people engaging in environmental work, research, education
and publicity. In addition, there are 3854 environmental supervision and
environmental law enforcement organs with more than 50 000 staff members.
Another 300 000 people work in enterprises and various government
departments in dealing with the environment.
The above figures and statistics, reported in China’s White Paper entitled
Environmental Protection in China (1996 – 2005), give a useful but static
picture of China’s domestic environmental governance. They do not tell us
how effective the laws, regulations and standards are, and how well the staff
involved in monitoring and enforcing compliance perform their tasks. Also
the White Paper has little or nothing to say about the evolving NGO
involvement in environmental protection in China, an increasingly vocal
sector in the country’s environmental management.
Largely thanks to its fast economic growth and industrial production,
China has become the world’s largest emitter of sulphur dioxide. The
subsequent creation of acid rain creates havoc for China’s environment, in
terms of economic costs and human welfare, and to a lesser extent for that of
its neighbours. In 2005 China emitted 25.5 million tonnes of the gas, which
was a 27% increase since 2000, of which coal- and oil-fired power plants
accounted for 11 million tonnes. The emissions increased to 26 million tonnes
in 2006.27 According to the Worldwatch Institute in Washington, DC, China
has 16 of the world’s 20 most air-polluted cities. A total of 357—more than
half—of the 696 cities and counties in China were affected by acid rain in
2005 because of sulphur dioxide pollution.28 In September 2006 SEPA and the
State Statistics Bureau issued a Green GDP report saying that pollution cost
the country an equivalent of 3.05% of the economic output and that it would
take a one-time direct investment of about $136 billion—nearly 7% of GDP—
to clean up all the pollution pumped into the country’s air, water and soil in
2004.29 Health costs form a major part of the economic losses.
In view of the huge ecological cost, three years after SEPA was elevated to
become a ministry, the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001 – 2005) set ambitious
emission-reduction targets and boosted environmental spending to 700
billion yuan ($85 billion), which was equivalent to 1.3% of GDP, up from
0.93% in the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996 – 2000) and 0.73% in the Eighth
one (1991 – 95) (though still below the 2% threshold suggested by the World
Bank).30 However, by early 2005, the actual spending was 30% short of the
target.31 Further, the 10th Five-Year Plan failed to meet 40% of its
environmental targets.32 SEPA estimated that the country would need 1.4
trillion yuan ($175 billion) in its 11th Five-Year Plan (2006 – 10) to tackle
environmental problems,33 representing about 1.5% of GDP. (In comparison,
developed countries were already spending about 1% to 2% of their GDP on
environmental protection even in the 1970s, with the USA spending 2% and
Japan 2%to 3%.)34 Chen Bin, the vice head of SEPA’s planning and finance































noticeable improvements could be made to the environment.35 It was
estimated that in 1996 – 2000 15% of the total spending on the environment
originated from multilateral and bilateral lending programmes and aid
budgets.36 For example, up to June 2006 the GEF has extended or approved
over $500 million to fund 45 projects in China.37
In 2004 China recorded more than 74 000 incidents of protest and unrest,
up from 58 000 a year earlier.38 In 2005 there were 51 000 pollution-related
disputes, up 30% a year earlier.39 Zhou Shengxian, head of SEPA, said in July
2007 that his agency received 1814 petitions from citizens ‘appealing for a
better environment’ in the first five months of the year, 8% up from the
corresponding period of the previous year.40 Apparently these figures have
alarmed the leadership, as social stability is the foundation of legitimate
governance in the country.41 However, there seems to be little or no
systematic analysis of the scale of these conflicts or of whether they were
directed at polluting factories or local government or both. Suffice to suggest
a close correlation between riots and environmental causes. In May 2006
China announced the establishment of three more environmental supervision
centres, in addition to two recently established, in order to strengthen the
enforcement of environmental protection law.42 In addition, six offices will be
set up to monitor civil and military nuclear security around the country.
These centres and offices will report directly to SEPA as a way of streamlining
procedures in dealing with environmental issues and disputes, so as to bypass
resistance from local government and inter-provincial rivalries.43 Although
SEPA has been elevated to ministerial level, its importance in China’s
domestic environmental structure has not gone unchallenged. Formidable
ministries such as those in the economic and industrial sectors have often put
immense political pressure on SEPA, which sometimes responded by using
‘naming and shaming’ tactics, exposing serious breaches of environmental
law to the public.
One of the recent measures taken by the government is a package of taxes
dubbed ‘chopsticks taxes’, aimed at reducing the use of wood products and at
increasing levies on luxury cars and yachts that consume a lot of fuel.44 Other
measures include the closing down of factories that produce heavy pollutants,
and the monitoring of some 300 000 factories;45 the cleaning up of rivers and
lakes; the imposition of heavy fines on polluters; the strengthening of the
legal system; and a stringent adherence to the requirements for industries to
submit environmental assessment reports to the government before major
infrastructural works can start.
Of the many serious environmental mishaps in China, the Songhua
benzene spill in late 2005 may have served as a major wake-up call to the
top Chinese leadership that something drastic needed to be done to clean
up the country’s environment. The poisonous chemical came from an
explosion in a plant in Jilin run by China National Petroleum
Corporation. The Songhua River incident, which led to a cutting off of
the normal supply of running water for five days to Harbin, the capital
city of Heilongjiang province in northeast China with over three-million
inhabitants, and also affected more than half a million people living






























downstream in Russia’s far east, has become a turning point in the official
Chinese thinking on environmental protection. Not only did China
apologise to Russia for the leak and Xie Zhenhua, head of SEPA, resign
following the incident, the clean-up of the Songhua over the next five
years is estimated to cost $3 billion.46 Subsequent to the Songhua spill the
central government began to inspect 21 000 plants that line China’s major
waterways and to review old environmental assessment reports.47 More
than half of these plants were found to be located along the Yangtze and
Yellow Rivers.
In view of the fragility of its one-sided economic growth, the country’s 11th
Five-Year Plan (2006 – 10) aims to cut 20% of energy consumption in terms
of per capita GDP growth, 10% of emissions of major pollutants, and to
increase forest coverage from 18.2% to 20%.48 By 2010 70% of city sewage
and 60% of non-toxic domestic waste are to be treated.49 Yet, despite all
these efforts, ordinary people in China continue to suffer from environmental
damage. So what can they do to help themselves apart from taking violent
protest actions?
The role of non-state actors50
In recent publications on public participation in environmental protection in
China,51 it has been suggested that public participation should be mutual and
directed in reciprocal ways, that is, it should involve public input into
government processes as well as government-initiated consultations with
private citizens and groups. The process of such inputs and consultations
should be open and transparent and should be conducted in a ‘scientific way’,
meaning a rational way devoid of ideological pressure. Furthermore,
decisions made must be acceptable to those who are affected by them,
directly or indirectly.
A subtle indicator of China’s compliance with commonly accepted
environmental standards is the government’s policy towards the growth of
environmental NGOs.52 In 1997 only a handful of NGOs of various kinds
existed in China. Most of them were based in the capital, Beijing. By August
2002 there were more than 250 NGOs across the country, in every province.53
Since the 1990s concerned Chinese individuals, mainly intellectuals, have
started to organise NGOs to promote environmental awareness. The first,54
Friends of Nature, was formally registered in March 1994 with the Ministry
of Civil Affairs. This was followed by another now well known NGO, Global
Village of Beijing, founded in 1996. The programmes and activities of these
and some other NGOs are funded by overseas agencies, with foundations like
Ford, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and Winrock International annually
contributing millions of dollars.55 According to Yang Dongping, a vice-
president of Friends of Nature, there are about 1000 indigenous green NGOs
in China, of which more than 100 are grassroots groups, 500 are student
groups, and the rest receive some form of government subsidy.56 A survey
conducted by the All-China Environment Federation, an NGO established in































environmental NGOs in China at the end of 2005,57 with a total individual
membership of 224 000.58 About 90% of these NGOs were initiated by
government departments and student volunteers, and only 20% had
registered with the government.59 Most of them are poor in resources and
many are too small to have any significant impact.
Chinese environmentalists made their debut on the international stage
when they attended the UN-sponsored World Summit on Sustainable
Development, held in Johannesburg, in late August 2002.60 The summit was
attended by leaders and representatives of over 100 countries as well as
delegates from a thousand NGOs around the world. Apart from Chinese
government officials, some 40 social organisations were present, including 11
grassroots NGOs from different parts of the country.61 The 20 delegates from
China’s environmental NGOs were sponsored by the British Embassy, the
Ford Foundation and Canada’s Civil Society Project.62 Although the voice
of Chinese environmentalists was said to be feeble at the international
forum,63 they have started to link up with international NGOs and to lobby or
work with their government, especially with SEPA. They have also worked
with the industrial sector at home to help alleviate environmental problems.
The UN conference was an eye-opening experience for many Chinese
grassroots NGO workers, as they were exposed to a flood of information on
global environmental issues. They also realised how far behind China’s NGO
development was, even in comparison with other developing countries like
Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia.64 In addition, they had the rare
opportunity of meeting their own Chinese colleagues from other parts of the
country. After the Johannesburg Summit Chinese delegates held a conference
in Nanjing in September 2002 to brief their colleagues in China and, as a
result, they drew up an action plan outlining their future work in the country,
emphasising the importance of NGO contributions and promoting the ideas of
sustainability and public participation.
Unlike other types of NGO, green groups in China are seen in a peculiar
light by the authorities. On the one hand, they are seen as less threatening, as
they tend to work with the government to alleviate environmental damage
which the government finds it difficult sometimes to tackle on its own. These
NGOs work more efficiently to motivate ordinary people to take steps to
protect their environmental interests. The existence of green NGOs can, apart
from helping to improve China’s environmental record, enhance the
country’s international image.65 On the other hand, the fact that they can
raise the level of public awareness over some rather volatile social and
environmental issues poses a potential threat to the legitimacy of the
authorities. Furthermore, the government is worried that such groups may
eventually evolve into a political party, as has happened in many overseas
countries. Somehow the government and the emerging NGO sector have to
learn to live and work with each other. During the campaign to compete for
the hosting of the 2008 Olympics, the Beijing Olympic Organising
Committee, a semi-governmental body, for the first time invited environ-
mental NGOs to attend proceedings as advisers, in order to promote the green
image of the Beijing Games.






























A courageous and adventurous nongovernmental initiative was the setting
up of the Centre for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims in Beijing in 1999,
with substantial financial support from the Ford Foundation. The director of
the centre is Wang Canfa, an environmental lawyer and a professor at the
China University of Politics and Law. The centre provides a channel for
citizens to voice their grievances against the authorities. Through legal
proceedings ordinary people can seek compensation from the government
and business corporations. Up to 2002 the centre had fielded thousands of
phone calls and had taken 22 cases it deemed most worthy to the courts. The
number of cases had risen to over 80 by mid-2006.66 Beginning with two to
three part-time volunteers in 1999, in 2004 its 200 or so volunteers received
6000 requests for help.67 In a landmark case raised by the centre in 2002 on
behalf of 100 peasant families against a paper factory for dumping toxic
chemicals into Shiliang River in eastern Jiangsu province, a local court ruled
against the factory and awarded compensation of 5.6 million yuan to the
affected families.68 According to influential green activist Liang Congjie,69
this was a landmark case, as almost nobody in China had ever used
environmental law to protect his or her rights before 1992.
A new non-governmental effort to combat environmental problems arose
from the business sector. Originally triggered by their concerns over the
annual sandstorms that blow from northern China to Beijing, around 100
business people (including 20 or so from Taiwan working in China) met in
mid-2004 to form an environmental group called Alxa SEE Ecology
Association (where Alxa or Alashan is the name of a place in the Mongolian
plateau, a seedbed of sandstorms, and SEE stands for society, entrepreneur
and ecology).70 By the end of 2005 this association has collected some 100
million yuan ($12 million)71 to fund works in combating sandstorms. This is
perhaps the first time that Chinese entrepreneurs have exercised their
corporate social responsibility in a collective way to forge a public – private
partnership to deal with environmental issues.
Another unique aspect of the development of green NGOs in China is the
development of government-organised NGOs or GONGOs. These organisa-
tions enjoy three advantages over grassroots NGOs: they are better resourced
as they are funded by the government, they can attract a relatively large
number of specialists and experts to work for them, and they can serve as
effective and efficient conduits between international organisations or donors,
civil society and the government.72 Two such organisations with strong links
to SEPA stand out: the China Environmental Culture Promotion Association
(first established in 1993), whose work was revived by Pan Yue when he
joined SEPA as vice minister in 2003; and the All-China Environment
Federation,73 a nationwide mass organisation established in April 2005 with
the aim of bringing the public and the government together to achieve
sustainable development. According to Ru Jiang, who carried out doctoral
research on China’s environmental issues at Stanford,74 GONGOs are
generally more effective in performing tasks related to the official
responsibilities of their supervisory organizations, such as policy consultation































effective in engaging in public education, environmental advocacy and
grassroots environmental activities. Although GONGOs have mushroomed as
a direct result of the administrative reform of 1998, which aimed at
downsizing government bureaucracy, they are increasingly independent of
government agencies. This is not only because of their exposure and access to
international rules, resources and technology but also because their second-
generation leaders and staff members are no longer recruited from the
government.75
Many international environmental NGOs work, sometimes in close
collaboration with local NGOs, to promote environmental protection by
introducing programmes and management techniques and by bringing in
much-needed funding. Groups such as WWF, Ecologia, Pacific Environment,
Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace have all set up projects or opened
offices in China.76
The role of local governments
As the bulk of environmental pollution takes place in the localities, it is
imperative to study why local authorities have failed to address the problem
successfully. The incentive structure that local officials face helps us
understand more about the mounting difficulties in remedying pollution at
the local levels. First, there are competing interests between combating
environmental degradation and maintaining production and employment.
For local officials whose performance is assessed by higher-level authorities
and local people on their record of economic growth, the latter goal is always
accorded a higher priority than the former. Even with a pollution-fee system
in place, local governments tend to offer their enterprises tax exemptions or
grants to offset the penalties.
Second, government officials’ thinking about environmental problems is
based on a hypothesis known as the ‘environmental Kuznets curve’ (EKC).77
The hypothesis asserts that environmental degradation increases in the early
stages of economic development (as indicated in higher emissions per capita)
until the process reaches a turning point or threshold at a higher level of
economic development. Thereafter the overall levels of degradation will
gradually fall and stabilise at a relatively low level. In other words, the
relationship between economic growth and its environmental impact shows
an inverted U-shape. The reasoning is that, at higher levels of development,
the economy will have been transformed into one based on information
technology and services, thereby reducing the rate of resource depletion.
Additional favourable factors include increased environmental consciousness
and enforcement of environmental regulations, increased use of cleaner and
more energy-efficient production technology, and enhanced commitment
to environmental expenditures. A policy implication of the EKC hypothesis
is that economic development is not a threat to the environment. Rather,
it should be conceived as a means to environmental improvement. So
there is no need to curtail economic growth to protect the environment.
This hypothesis was once believed to be applicable to China. Between






























1997 and 2001 China’s GDP grew by 33.7% while carbon dioxide emissions
rose by 0.2% only and sulphur dioxide emissions even fell by nearly 40%.
However, there were controversies surrounding the remarkable drop in the
emissions. In addition to falsified data, the closure of a large number of
small-scale, inefficient coal mines was also an important factor. Economic
development, however, has not brought with it a decrease in environmental
degradation.78
Third, the efforts of local government to curb environmental pollution are
undermined by the fact that the dumping of hazardous waste into the
environment and measures to safeguard the environment possess the
properties of externality and public goods.79 With no charges being made
for the harm done to the environment, the market system cannot discourage
individuals and firms from discharging wastes into the air and water. Given
that, within a threshold level, non-payers’ consumption of public goods is not
at the expense of payers and that it is highly difficult or costly to exclude non-
payers from consuming public goods, individuals and firms tend to ‘free-ride’
with respect to the provision of public goods (ie environmental clean-up in
our case). Both result in an oversupply of polluting goods and an
undersupply of public goods.80
Following this logic, local county officials in China are inclined to take a
free ride on others’ investments in environmental clean-up. This is because,
while the county would have to shoulder the full cost of the investment, it
would share the benefits with the people downstream who contribute little to
the clean-up and yet cannot be excluded from the enjoyment of it.
Analogously environmental pollution is a ‘public bad’ whose harmful effects
are experienced by all who use the environmental resource. To minimise a
local population’s exposure to pollution, local officials are tempted to push
polluting firms close to the downstream boundaries of local jurisdictions. In
so doing local people are ‘minimally’ hurt by the toxic wastes, and local firms
are not charged for damaging the environment, while their industrial
production can be maintained. The decentralisation of economic powers to
sub-national governments is consequently at odds with the collective efforts
to achieve environmental goals. This is one of the reasons why environmental
experts have called for the power to combat environmental problems to be
vested with a regional or central agency, and that Pan Yue of SEPA demands
that environmental officials be given real power to implement existing laws
and regulations and that environmental inspectors in various sectors be
unified.81
The central government is putting mounting pressure on local governments
and enterprises to rein in pollution. In a SEPA inspection campaign launched
in October 2006, it was found that only 30% of the investigated projects had
obtained a pass in pollution control design before they were allowed to begin
construction. The environmental watchdog blacklisted a total of 82 projects
worth 1.12 trillion yuan that had allegedly seriously violated environmental
protection assessment rules. In a Politburo study session in December 2006
Hu Jintao urged local authorities to conserve the environment, linking energy































2007 SEPA stripped four cities in Shanxi province of the power to approve
new construction projects for their failure to take measures to protect the
environment.83 Working with the People’s Bank of China, the central bank,
and the China Banking Regulatory Commission, SEPA is to refuse polluting
firms bank credit. However, it remains to be seen whether this ‘green credit’
policy is enforceable at local levels where officials attach primary importance
to economic growth.84
Domestic impact on global environmental governance
As the largest and fastest-growing developing country, China’s domestic
experiences in environmental governance may be of some use to other
developing nations and have impacts on its neighbours. The fact that China
shares land borders with 14 countries and shares 15 rivers with them means
that China’s environmental problems can easily be spread to them, as
evidenced by the Songhua Incident, increasing the potential for environ-
mental conflicts. These issues have a clear impact on China’s diplomacy, not
least in terms of environmental justice. China jealously guards the principle
of common but differentiated responsibility, for its own benefits as well as for
the developing world. It has chastised some developed countries for using
environmental excuses, in the form of trade barriers, for tying development
aid to environmental standards, for the exploitation of the natural resources
of the Third World, and for the transfer of polluting industries to poor
countries, to delay Third World development. These acts constitute what the
Chinese government regards as environmental imperialism.85
China has become an innovator in environmental governance institutions
in some areas. These include a National Environmental Model City
programme, the proposed establishment of a green GDP,86 the use of
tradeable emissions permits, the inclusion of environmental performance as a
factor in evaluating staff performance and promotion, and a widespread use
of hotlines for reporting environmental offences.87 In some technical areas,
such as biodiversity, as well as projects to conserve water and to protect
wildlife, including pandas and golden monkeys, China is seen to have become
a leader.88 China’s experiences in combating desertification has been cited by
Hama Arba Diallo, an executive director of the UN Convention to Combat
Desertification, as worthy of sharing with other countries.89
China’s stance on two crucial issues that tend to divide more developed
countries from less developed countries is worthy of note for its direct impact
on the working of global environmental governance. They are: how should
the burden of tackling environmental deterioration be fairly shared among
countries of uneven levels of economic development? And how should the
issue of climate change be framed?
While China has indicated a willingness to participate in talks on fighting
global warming beyond 2012, it maintains that more developed countries
should take the lead in addressing the problem of environmental pollution
and that it would reject any imposition on it of mandatory quotas of
reductions in greenhouse emissions.90 Instead, it argues for improving its






























relatively low energy efficiency to slow the growth of the emissions.91 Its
arguments are threefold. First, China’s per capita emissions are low in
comparison with the world average, and that of the industrialised countries in
particular.92 Second, as a developing country China lacks the financial or
technological resources to shift to the use of environmentally-friendly energy
technology. Finally, developed nations are more responsible for the
accumulation of greenhouse gases than developing ones (see Tables 1 and
2 in the Appendix).93 However, the USA has declared that it would not be a
party to a new climate change treaty if it was not applicable to China, India
and the rest of the Third World.94 In the final analysis, as argued by
neorealists, global public goods can only be provided by great powers
(hegemons). The effectiveness of global environmental governance depends
to a large extent on whether the USA and China, the two principal emitters
of greenhouse gases, could jointly assume a leadership role and reach a
compromise on a new protocol beyond 2012.
A related issue is how the international community should define the
nature of climate change. In April 2007, when the UN Security Council,
under the presidency of the UK, was debating whether climate change
should be considered an imminent threat to global peace and security,
China and a group of developing countries were opposed to the discussions.
China argued that climate change is an issue of sustainable development95
and that the ‘Security Council has neither the professional competence in
handling climate change, nor is it the right decision-making place for
extensive participation leading up to widely acceptable proposals’. The
developing countries were of the view that climate change is an issue for
the General Assembly, a more democratic and representative body, and
for the Economic and Social Council. Third World countries are concerned
that a securitisation of global warming would widen the powers of the
powerful states in the Security Council and leave the door open for
encroachment on national sovereignty and intervention in internal affairs
by great powers in the West.96
Global impact on domestic environmental governance
In examining the international sources of environmental policy change in
China, Robert Falkner has identified two dynamics at work: one is
international socialising and learning through China’s political integration
with the world, such as participation in international organisations and
entering into international treaties; the other is China’s economic globalisa-
tion through trade, which helps to upgrade its environmental standards to
meet the higher standards set by the developed world with which China has
substantial trade.97
By mid-2006 China had entered into bilateral environmental co-operation
agreements or memorandums of understanding with 42 countries.98 Its
participation in global environmental governance seems to serve at least
two purposes. First, it uses the global environmental governance as a































given ‘common but differentiated treatment’, a principle which would allow
these countries greater flexibility in complying with internationally agreed
standards so that they can have more time to catch up with the West in
their industrialisation.
Second, the Chinese government can use the signing and ratification of
international treaties relating to environmental protection to put pressure
on domestic manufacturers and consumers and on those with vested
interests to take steps to improve the environment. The measures taken in
this respect include legal, economic, and administrative means, and the
introduction to China of expertise and financial support from international
organisations and rich countries. China’s membership of the World Trade
Organization serves as a good way of improving the quality of its
manufacturing products so as to meet certain environmental standards. Its
close working relationships with the World Bank and the UNDP help to
secure the necessary funding and technology to enhance its environmental
work. With financial and technical aid from the UNDP and Norway worth
$2.4 million, China is scheduled to introduce a pilot scheme to analyse
and study ways to mitigate environmental changes in provinces and
regions that are sensitive to climate change and that use fossil fuel
intensively.99 China is the largest recipient of grants and loans from the
World Bank for its environmental work. In a similar vein, China’s
interactions with various global environmental actors at various levels
serve to break down domestic inter-agency obstacles that might stand in
the way of bureaucratic co-ordination.
The hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games is likely to push China to improve
its environmental protection standards. The Chinese government has vowed
to run a green Olympics. Under mounting pressure from the International
Olympic Committee, whose President, Jacques Rogge, issued a grim warning
in August 2007 that Beijing’s poor air quality could cause a postponement of
some endurance sports events,100 China has gone to great lengths to clean up
the environment ahead of the Games. Polluting factories along Beijing’s
rivers have been either relocated or closed; Capital Iron and Steel, Beijing’s
largest polluter, has been closed and moved to Hebei province.101 The
Chinese authorities are also contemplating ordering 1.3 million of Beijing’s
three million-strong vehicles off the city’s streets during the Games.102 The
impact of a trial car ban in August 2007 on air quality was, however, not
visible because about one-third of the particulate matter in Beijing originates
outside the city. Environmental pollution is now a nationwide problem on
which the capital city seems to have lost its grip.103
Conclusion
Domestically China has done quite a lot of work to combat environmental
degradation in recent years, but because of the sheer size of the problem and
its neglect since 1949, the country faces an uphill struggle. With an
environment that is likely to get worse before it may get better, China will
continue to export its environmental problems to neighbouring countries






























through river pollution, air pollution and acid rain. It will also continue to
import heavy pollution-producing industries through foreign direct invest-
ments made by multinational corporations and to spread these industries,
together with their pollution, to the rural parts of the country. In a certain
irony, the international community has to make use of both international
pressure and international assistance to help China to help itself.104 China’s
green NGOs can potentially play an important role, not only to link up with
international NGOs and multilateral institutions to deal with the problem, but
also to relate more directly with grassroots problems than do government
agencies.
Neil Carter and Arthur Mol have concluded that the decisions and actions
of Chinese leaders—at home and abroad—‘strongly reflect well-perceived
domestic interests and priorities (sovereignty and security being among the
most important), and there is little evidence of an acceptance of a wider
global environmental responsibility as a future global hegemon.’105 The
success or otherwise of China’s environmental policies, according to
Elizabeth Economy,106 lies with a broader and more fundamental set of
institutional reforms that would promote transparency, the rule of law and
official accountability. In other words, unless political rights are properly
protected, it will be difficult to make significant progress in environmental
rights.107 To be sure China has made some progress, but more needs to be
done quickly in order to deal with a fast deteriorating environment.
Domestically there is a pressing need for the central government to establish
a governance framework that contains incentive for local officials to embrace
the idea and practice of environmental protection rather than relying on the
present costly command-and-control style of domestic environmental
governance.
Obviously China’s domestic approach can hardly be applicable to
the management of global environmental governance, for reasons of
international anarchy and power competition among big powers. Also
China has shown little sign of contributing to the setting of a global agenda
for environmental protection, thanks to its limited capability and its lack of
international experience. What it could do is to try to eliminate the Chinese
sources of global environmental problems as much as possible so as to reduce
adverse effects on the global commons, using self-help or assistance from the
outside. While China is changing itself, at its own pace, to change the world,
the world can help China to help itself to enhance environmental protection.
China’s environmental problems are so serious that any significant
improvements made in any sector of its environment would be greeted with
applause by others. China has accumulated a lot of experiences during its
development, including those in combating environmental problems, some of
which can be of use to the developing world. That said, with a self-
proclaimed aspiration to be a responsible great power and the privileged
position of holding a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, China is
obliged to demonstrate by deed how it is to assume the responsibility for the

































1 For a judicious account, see Liu Jianguo & Jared Diamond, ‘China’s environment in a globalizing
world: how China and the rest of the world affect each other’, Nature, 30 June 2005, pp 1179 – 1186.
See also ‘China’s limits to growth: greening state and society’, Development and Change, 37 (1) 2006
(special issue); and Neil Carter & Arthur PJ Mol (eds), Environmental Governance in China, London:
Routledge, 2007.
2 A recent study of an aspect of this interface is Katherine Morton, International Aid and China’s
Environment: Taming the Yellow Dragon, London: Routledge, 2005. This book looks into how
international aid helps to build China’s capacity to deal with environmental problems, arguing that,
apart from legal compliance, capacity building is an important aspect of environmental improvement.
3 The US Environmental Protection Agency estimates that on certain days almost 25% of the
particulate matter clotting the skies above Los Angles can be traced to China. See Jim Yardley,
‘China’s next big boom could be the foul air’, New York Times, 30 October 2005; and Keith Bradsher
& David Barboza, ‘Pollution from Chinese coal casts a global shadow’, New York Times, 11 June
2006.
4 An environmental official in New Zealand recently pointed out that the local carbon dioxide levels
were at an all-time high and China has been implicated for causing the problem through the
consumption of coal and petrol. See Matthew Torbit, ‘NZ carbon dioxide surge blamed on Chinese
boom’, Dominion Post (Wellington), 1 June 2006.
5 Benjamin Robertson, ‘Caught in the ebb’, South China Morning Post, 19 October 2006; and Evelyn
Goh, ‘China in the Mekong River Basin: the regional security implications of resource development
on the Lancang Jiang’, in Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers & Amitav Acharya (eds), Non-
traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitisation, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, pp 225 – 246.
6 According to the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, China led the world in carbon
dioxide emissions in 2006 by producing 6200 tonnes of the gas. The USA churned out 5800 tonnes.
The rise was a result of the country’s dependence on coal as its major energy source, as well as of its
rising cement output. John Vidal & David Adam, ‘China overtakes US as world’s biggest CO2
emitter’, Guardian, 19 June 2007.
7 BP statistical Review of World Energy June 2007, London: BP, 2007, pp 12, 21.
8 Yang Dongping, ‘Shizi lukou de Zhongguo huanjing baohu’ (China’s environmental protection at a
crossroads), in Liang Congjie et al (eds), 2005 nian: Zhongguo de huanjing weiju yu tuwei (Crisis and
Breakthrough of China’s Environment), Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2006, p 18.
9 The calculation is based on sources from the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC
(‘China’s participation in multilateral treaties’, in Chinese), at www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/wjb/zzjg/tyfls/
tfsckzlk/zgcjddbty/default.htm, accessed 21 June 2006.
10 Gerald Chan, China’s Compliance in Global Affairs: Trade, Arms Control, Environmental Protection,
Human Rights, Singapore: World Scientific, 2006, pp 148 – 149. See also China’s White Paper entitled
Environmental Protection in China (1996 – 2005), Beijing: Information Office, State Council, 2006. A
complete list of international environmental treaties that China has signed or ratified can be found at
www.zhb.gov.cn/eic/651615674891763712/20031017/1042166.shtml, accessed 21 June 2006.
11 According to the US Energy Department, China has joined a global partnership to build FutureGen,
a $1 billion project billed as the world’s cleanest coal-burning power plant. See ‘China joins
FutureGen; signs efficiency and renewable energy protocol with US’, Green Car Congress, 16
December 2006, at www.greencarcongress.com, accessed 8 May 2007. All dollar amounts in this
paper are in US currency unless otherwise specified.
12 As of late 2006 China and Australia have entered into 11 projects worth $4 million to improve safety
at China’s coal mines, to cut greenhouse gas emissions and to develop alternative sources of energy.
Australia funded half the project costs. See ‘Australian pact to study coal projects’, South China
Morning Post, 18 October 2006.
13 ‘China aims to boost renewable energy use—minister’, Reuters, 17 March 2007, at www.alertnet.org/
thenews/newsdesk/L17219097.htm, accessed 8 May 2007.
14 Hu Jintao and George W Bush established a US–China Strategic Economic Dialogue in September
2006. The first two meetings were held in December 2006 and May 2007. Steven R Weisman, ‘US and
China set up teams for economic talks’, New York Times, 21 September 2006; Cary Huang, ‘Talks will
test sinews of Sino-US relations’, South China Morning Post, 14 December 2006.
15 Daniel C Esty &Maria H Ivanova, ‘Globalization and environmental protection: a global governance
perspective’, ICFAI Journal of Environmental Law, 4 (4) 2005, pp 41 – 66.
16 According to Seyom Brown, ‘despite the vigorous leadership of its first Secretary General Maurice
Strong, it [the UN Environment Programme] was provided with few carrots (financial resources) and
no punitive sticks whatsoever with which to induce adherence to its resolutions’. See Seyom Brown,






























International Relations in a Changing Global System: Toward a Theory of World Polity, Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1992, p 95.
17 China’s official status is a non-Annex I party to the Convention. China’s State Development Planning
Commission submitted in December 2004 its first ‘Initial national communication on climate change’.
See ‘China,’ in United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change website, at http://
maindb.unfccc.int/public/country.pl?country¼CN, accessed 18 April 2007.
18 The number of cars increased to 19 million in 2005 from a mere four million five years ago. ‘Grim
tales: the more growth, the more damage to the environment’, The Economist, 31 March – 6 April
2007. According to Hamish McDonald, satellite images, released by the European Space Agency in
2005 showed that the surrounding area of northeast China had the world’s most dense nitrogen
dioxide, produced mainly by vehicles. McDonald, ‘Images show Beijing vehicle emission pollution is
world’s worst’, Sydney Morning Herald, 26 October 2005.
19 Shi Jiangtao, ‘Greenhouse gas trading bonus for mainland’, South China Morning Post, 27 October
2006.
20 Ibid. Another report said that the State Development and Reform Commission approved a total of
279 CDM projects, of which 37 received worldwide certification. Huanqiu shibao (Global Times),
16 March 2007, at http://www.paper.people.com.cn/hqsb/html/2007-03/16/content_12634992.html,
accessed 20 March 2007.
21 Other provinces in China also developed similar projects. Guangdong, for example, announced in
2006 the establishment of a trading scheme with Hong Kong to reduce traditional pollutants such as
sulphur dioxide. See Bill Savadove, ‘Steelmaker cleaning up its act in Nanjing’, South China Morning
Post, 14 August 2006.
22 John J Fialka, ‘Beijing to be beneficiary of giant emissions trade’,Wall Street Journal Asia, 30 August
2006.
23 Mure Dickie & Fiona Harvey, ‘China and UN plan carbon trading exchange’, Financial Times,
5 February 2007.
24 Savadove, ‘Steelmaker cleaning up its act in Nanjing’.
25 The figures and statistics in this paragraph are taken from Environmental Protection in China.
26 SEPA has got tough with four of the six biggest power groups in China, ordering the halt of all new
projects in, for example, Tangshan in the northern Hebei province, to force them to take immediate
action to meet environment standards. Shi Jiangtao, ‘Beijing gets tough with penalties for polluters’,
South China Morning Post, 11 January 2007.
27 ‘China hit by rising air pollution’, BBC news, 3 August 2006, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-
pacific/5241844.stm, accessed 20 April 2007; Cheung Chi-fai & Shi Jiangtao, ‘7b yuan bill put on
mainland emissions’, South China Morning Post, 31 August 2006; ‘Cap-and-trade system urged to
curb sulphur dioxide emissions’, Gov.cn (the Chinese government’s official web portal), 14 September
2006, at http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-09/14/content_388553.htm, accessed 21 August 2007; and
‘China fails to achieve pollution control goal in 2006’, Gov.cn, 12 February 2007, at http://
www.gov.cn/english/2007-02/12/content_525059.htm, accessed 21 August 2007. In the first half of
2007 the emissions were 12.63 million tonnes, down 0.88% from the same period of the previous year.
Sun Xiaohua, ‘Emission cuts miss green goal’, China Daily, 22 August 2007.
28 Shi Jiangtao, ‘500b-yuan loss from sulfur cloud’, South China Morning Post, 4 August 2006.
29 ‘Pollution costs China 511.8b yuan in 2004’, Gov.cn, 7 September 2006, at http://www.gov.cn/english/
2006-09/07/content_381756.htm, accessed 21 August 2007; and Jane Spencer, ‘Why Beijing is trying
to tally the hidden costs of pollution as China’s economy booms’, Wall Street Journal, 2 October
2006.
30 Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution through Reform, New York: WW Norton,
2004, p 282; and ‘China’s environment: a great wall of waste’, The Economist, 21 – 27 August 2004.
31 ‘China says environment spending falls short’, Reuters, 29 March 2005, at http://www.threegorge-
sprobe.org, accessed 16 June 2006.
32 ‘Premier pledges green performance assessment amidst dust-filled skies’, China Development Brief, 24
April 2006, at www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com/node/559, accessed 3 May 2006. Premier Wen Jiabao
stunned the nation by admitting that the government had failed to meet its environmental targets in
the Tenth Five-Year Plan—a rare admission by a PRC head of government.
33 Mao Rubai, ‘Time to break free from extensive growth mode’, China Daily, 25 July 2006.
34 Shengtai guanli yu baohu (Ecological Management and Protection), Fuyin baokan jiliao (Reprints of
Materials from Books and Journals), published by China Renda Social Sciences Information Centre,
Renmin University of China, No 3, 2003, p 25.
35 ‘Premier pledges green performance assessment amidst dust-filled skies’.
36 Bruce Tremayne & Penny de Waal, ‘Business opportunities for foreign firms related to China’s
environment’, China Quarterly, 156, 1998, p 1030.































38 Francesco Sisci, ‘Is China headed for a social ‘‘red alert’’?’ Asia Times Online, 20 October 2005, at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/GJ20Cb01.html, accessed 23 April 2007.
39 ‘China’s pristine rise to ‘‘power’’? Implications for Asia’s political and ecological footprint’,
Singapore Institute of International Affairs, at www.siiaonline.org, June 2006.
40 Tracy Quek, ‘Chinese fuming over pollution’, Straits Times, 6 July 2007; and Jonathan Watts, ‘China
blames growing social unrest on anger over pollution’, Guardian, 6 July 2007.
41 For an elaboration of the idea of political legitimacy in China, both traditional and modern, see Guo
Baogang, ‘China’s peaceful development, regime stability and political legitimacy’, in Guo Sujian
(ed), China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ in the 21st Century: Domestic and International Conditions, Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2006, pp 39 – 60.
42 ‘China to install 3 more regional environment centers’, Xinhua news, 5 May 2006.
43 Shi Jiangtao, ‘Green watchdog extends its reach’, South China Morning Post, 2 August 2006.
44 ‘Follow the chopsticks’ (editorial), New York Times, 25 March 2006; and ‘China aims taxes at cars
and the rich’, International Herald Tribune, 22 March 2006.
45 Nathan Nankivell, ‘China’s pollution and the threat to domestic and regional stability’, China Brief, 5
(22) 2005.
46 ‘Toxic leak threat to Chinese city’, BBC News, 23 November 2005, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/4462760.stm; ‘China apologises for river spill’, BBC News, 26 November 2005, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4474284.stm; ‘China’s environment chief quits’, BBC News, 2
December 2005, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4491562.stm; and ‘New spills hit Chinese
rivers’, BBC News, 9 January 2006, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4595168.stm, accessed 17
April 2007.
47 ‘China tackles pollution—top official steps up campaign to enforce environmental rules’, Asian Wall
Street Journal, 13 March 2006.
48 ‘Environmental pollution major problem in China’s development’, Beijing Review, 14 March 2006, at
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/EN/06-10-e/lianghui-06/3-14/3-14-7.htm; and ‘China in 2010’, Beijing
Review, at http://www.bjreview.com.cn/EN/06-15-e/bus-1.htm, accessed 19 April 2007.
49 Decision No 39 made by the State Council to increase environmental protection, 3 December 2005.
50 Information in this section is largely taken from Chan, China’s Compliance in Global Affairs, pp 158 –
162, with some modifications and updates.
51 See, for example, Han Shasha, ‘Lun huanjing guihua zhong de gongzhong canyu’ (On public
participation in environmental planning), Huanjing daobao (Environmental Herald (Nanjing)), 3,
2001, pp 13 – 14.
52 For a graphical presentation of the growth of these NGOs, see Yang Guobin, ‘Environmental NGOs
and institutional dynamics in China’, China Quarterly, 181, March 2005, p 51, Figures 2, 3.
53 Ray Cheung, ‘NGO pioneer calls for incentives to give’, South China Morning Post, 21 August 2002.
This number seems small, probably because of a stricter definition of NGO used by the source, and so
a large number of government-sponsored NGOs have been excluded. The Law Yearbook of China
indicates that there were 153 359 shehui tuanti (or social organisations) and 135 181 minban feiqiye
danwei (private non-enterprise units, such as research and educational institutes and foundations). See
Zhongguo falue nianjian (Law Yearbook of China), Beijing: Zhongguo falue nianjian chubanshe, 2005,
p 1081. Zhuang Ailing, founder of the Shanghai-based Non-Profit Organisation Development Centre,
estimates that China at present has about 700 000 to 800 000 NGOs. See Shanghai Daily, 23 August
2004, p 12.
54 Although the China Environment and Development International Co-operation Committee, formed
in April 1992, was billed as an NGO, it is largely a government-sponsored organisation.
55 Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 April 2003, p 30.
56 Yang, ‘China’s environmental protection at a crossroads’, in Liang, Crisis and Breakthrough of
China’s Environment, pp 21, 239. The figure of more than 1000 green NGOs in China is also confirmed
by China’s White Paper, Environmental Protection in China. Estimates outside of China point to a
number of around 2000. See Liu & Diamond, ‘China’s environment in a globalizing world’, p 1186;
and Elizabeth Economy, ‘China’s environment movement’, Testimony before the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China Roundtable on ‘Environmental NGOs in China: Encouraging Action
and Addressing Public Grievances’, Washington, DC, 7 February 2005, at http://www.cecc.gov/
pages/roundtables/020705/index.php, accessed 29 August 2007.
57 Obviously, these are registered NGOs in China. Jennifer Turner of the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, is of the opinion that there are 2000 unregistered ones. See
‘China’s NGOs: independent actors or government puppets?’, China Environment Forum, Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, 15 May 2006, at www.wilsoncenter.org,
accessed 20 June 2006. According to the All-China Environmental Federation, only about 200 of
these 2768 green groups lack an official background. See Shi Jiangtao, ‘Ease control of NGOs, experts
urge Beijing’, South China Morning Post, 30 October 2006.






























58 Li Fangchao, ‘NGOs in difficulty, survey shows’, China Daily, 24 April 2006.
59 Ibid.
60 In the first major UN conference on the environment held in Stockholm in 1972 Chinese government
officials were there to present themselves and to learn from the experience of others. In the second
major UN conference on the environment held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the Chinese officials were
embarrassed by the fact that there was no NGO representation from China. It was only in
Johannesburg in 2002 that Chinese green NGOs made their debut.
61 Liao Xiaoyi, in Luse jizhe shalong (Green Journalist Saloon), Beijing: Zhongguo huanjing kexue
chubanshe, 2005, p 136.
62 Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, ‘Mainland NGOs join world stage at summit’, South China Morning Post, 16
August 2002. See also ‘Mainland NGOs to attend Johannesburg Development Summit’, China News
Digest, 23 August 2002, at http://www.cnd.org/CND-Global/CND-Global.02-08-22.html, accessed
29 August 2007.
63 See ‘NGO to voice their views louder’, at www.gvbchina.org/English/englishintro.html, accessed 30
September 2002.
64 Liao Xiaoyi, in Green Journalist Saloon, p 137.
65 Elizabeth Economy, ‘Environmental enforcement in China’, in Kristen A Day (ed), China’s
Environment and the Challenge of Sustainable Development, Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2005, p 113.
66 Robin Kwong, ‘Victory is a rare pleasure for China’s Erin Brockovich’, South China Morning Post,
23 July 2006.
67 ‘Skeletal legal aid requires flesh and muscle’, China Development Brief, 14 November 2004, at http://
www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com/node/307, accessed 27 June 2006.
68 Wang Canfa, ‘Chinese environmental law enforcement: current deficiencies and suggested reforms’,
Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, 8 (2), 2006 – 07.
69 Liang was the founder of Friends of Nature. He is the grandson of Liang Qichao, an influential turn-
of-the-century scholar who hoped to reform China’s moribund imperial system along democratic
lines. Liang is also a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee. See Todd
Lappin, ‘Can green mix with red? Environmentalism in China’, The Nation, 14 February 1994.
70 See the SEE website, at http://see.sina.com.cn/.
71 ‘NGOs unite to protect environment’, China Daily, 10 November 2005.
72 Fu Tao, ‘Zhongguo minjian huanjing zuzhi de fazhan’ (Development of NGOs in China), in Liang,
Crisis and Breakthrough of China’s Environment, p 244.
73 All-China Environment Federation website, at www.acef.com.cn.
74 Ru Jiang’s testimony before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Roundtable on
‘Environmental NGOs in China: Encouraging Action and Addressing Public Grievances’,
Washington, DC, 7 February 2005, at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/020705/index.php,
accessed 29 August 2007.
75 Wu Fengshi, ‘New partners or old brothers? GONGOs in transnational environmental advocacy in
China’, China Environment Series, 5, 2002, at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ACF3C9.pdf,
accessed 20 April 2007.
76 See Yang Guobin, ‘Global environmentalism hits China’, YaleGlobal Online, 4 February 2004, at
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/acticle.print?id¼3250, accessed 6 February 2004.
77 Simon Kuznets, the Nobel laureate in economic science in 1971, argued that economic inequality rises
as the process of economic development proceeds until a turning point is reached. Thereafter,
economic inequality falls and remains stable as per capita income rises. The inverted U-shaped
relations he portrayed have since been called the Kuznets Curve.
78 Zmarak Shalizi, ‘Energy and emissions: local and global efforts of the giants’ rise’, in L Alan Winters
& Shahid Yusuf (eds), Dancing with Giants: China, India, and the Global Economy, Washington, DC:
World Bank, 2007, p 144. There is no conclusive evidence to show that the EKC hypothesis holds true.
Environmental economists are of the view that it holds true for some pollutants such as sulphur
dioxide, but not for carbon dioxide and municipal waste or for the global environment at large. Roger
Perman et al, Natural Resources and Environmental Economics, Harlow: Pearson Education, 2003, pp
36 – 40.
79 For the purpose of this paper about the environment, an externality is said to occur 1) when
an agent does harm to the environment and no compensation is made by the agent to the
affected parties; or 2) when an agent contributes to the cleaning of the environment and
receives no payment from the beneficiaries. The provision of public goods refers to all spill-over
activities that address environmental deterioration. The goods are therefore undersupplied by the
market.
80 Perman et al, Natural Resources and Environmental Economics, pp 126 – 127, 134.
81 Lieberthal, Governing China, pp 281 – 286; Pan Yue, ‘China’s green debt’, Project Syndicate,































82 Shi Jiangtao, ‘Conservation comes first, Hu warns local officials’, South China Morning Post, 27
December 2006.
83 Rong Jiaojiao, ‘China focus: central government seeks strengthened authority to improve efficiency’,
Xinhua news, 14 March 2007; and Stephen Chen, ‘Shanxi city shut polluting factories’, South China
Morning Post, 8 March 2007.
84 Shi Jiangtao, ‘Heavy industrial polluters to be refused bank loans’, South China Morning Post, 6 July
2007; ‘Green credit: to fight pollution, China takes the capitalist route’, International Herald Tribute,
30 July 2007, at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/07/30/business/pollute.php, accessed 29 August
2007; and Stephen Chen, ‘Top creditors still in the dark about green regulations’, South China
Morning Post, 31 July 2007.
85 Pu Ping, ‘Huanjing wenti: Zhongguo guoji zhanlue de xin keti’ (Environment: a new issue in China’s
international strategy), Jiaoxue yu yanjiu (Teaching and Study), 4, 2006, pp 18 – 24.
86 A green GDP proposal was first put forward in 2004 by SEPA, but has now been shelved or abandoned
because of the complexities involved in compiling and calculating a green GDP index, as well as of
opposition from local authorities. Instead China is working to introduce a ‘green accounting’ which
uses flow charts to track resources such as water, raw materials and grass lands, a new system
supported by the UN and Norway. See Richard McGregor, ‘China abandons plan for green GDP
index’, Financial Times, 9 May 2006; McGregor, ‘China faces $136bn pollution clean-up’, Financial
Times, 7 September 2006; and Joseph Kahn & Jim Yardley, ‘As China roars, pollution reaches deadly
extremes’, New York Times, 26 August 2007.
87 Neil T Carter & Arthur PJ Mol, ‘Domestic and transnational dynamics of a future hegemon’,
Environmental Politics, 15 (2) 2006, p 338.
88 James D Seymour, ‘China’s environment: a bibliographic essay’, in Day, China’s Environment and the
Challenge of Sustainable Development, p 261.
89 ‘Desert shrinking by 7585 sq km annually’, China View, at http://www.chinaview.cn, accessed 30 May
2006.
90 Jim Yardley, ‘China says rich countries should take lead on global warming’, New York Times, 7
February 2007; Sebastian Moffett & Shai Oster, ‘China signs on to tackle global-warming issues’,
Wall Street Journal Online, 12 April 2007, at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB117629147324066237.html, accessed 20 April 2007; ‘Emission cuts but no caps, review suggests’,
South China Morning Post, 17 April 2007; and ‘Beijing admits climate change will be harmful’, South
China Morning Post, 23 April 2007.
91 Kahn & Yardley, ‘As China roars, pollution reaches deadly extremes’.
92 In 2003 China’s per capita emissions of carbon dioxide were 3.2 tonnes, while the world average was
3.7 tonnes and the USA’s was 20 tonnes. ‘China about to become top carbon emitter’, Financial
Times, 19 April 2007.
93 However, Fatih Birol of the International Energy Agency (IEA) is concerned that the surge in China’s
greenhouse gas emissions, if unchecked, would offset reductions in emissions from Europe, the USA
and Japan. Shai Oster, ‘China seems poised to pass US as top greenhouse-gas emitter’, Wall Street
Journal Online, 24 April 2007, at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117735208071379218.html, accessed
24 April 2007. Whether there should be mandatory emission reduction targets for China is a
controversial issue with major implications for China’s foreign relations. One commentary in Canada
asks sarcastically why Canada, a small-population country, should make sacrifices itself in lowering
greenhouse gas emissions if China could expand emissions. It said, ‘Canada produces 160 million
tonnes a year of the world’s eight billion tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions. Were Canada to
eliminate all of its GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions, China’s increases would replace them—every last
ounce—in 18 months. Were Canada to eliminate 10 percent of its emissions, China’s increases would
replace them all in 60 days. As noble as self-sacrifice can occasionally be, it must have—somewhere—
a rational purpose’. Neil Reynolds, ‘As China spews pell-mell, why bother with Kyoto?’, Globe and
Mail, 21 February 2007.
94 ‘China about to become top carbon emitter’. That is why the New York Times criticises the USA and
China in an editorial for forming an ‘alliance of denial’, with both ‘using each other’s inaction as an
excuse to do nothing’. See ‘Warming and global security’, New York Times, 20 April 2007.
95 This contrasts with the remark made by Hu Jintao in a CCP Politburo study session in December
2006, when he said that environmental protection was an issue of national and economic security.
96 ‘UN attacks climate change as threat to peace’, International Herald Tribune, 17 April 2007, at http://
www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/17/news/climate.php, accessed 18 April 2007; ‘UN Council hits
impasse over debate on warming’, New York Times, 18 April 2007; Andrew Clark, ‘Climate change
threatens security, UK tells UN’, Guardian, 18 April 2007; and Le Tian, ‘Security Council ‘‘not right
place’’ to discuss climate’, China Daily, 19 April 2007.
97 Robert Falkner, ‘International sources of environmental policy change in China: the case of
genetically modified food’, Pacific Review, 19 (4) 2006, pp 473 – 494.






























98 Environmental Protection in China.
99 The pilot programme is to cover Qinghai, Tibet, Ningxia, Shanxi, Liaoning, Inner Mongolia and
Hebei. Eventually, it will be extended to all provinces and regions. Sun Xiaohua, ‘New program will
take climate fight to provinces’, China Daily, 18 April 2007.
100 ‘Air quality could affect games’, CNN.com, 7 August 2007, at http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/
international/2007/08/07/intv.cdb.ioc.pres.jacques.rogge.cnn, accessed on 22 August 2007.
101 Stephen Chen, ‘Race is on to clean waterways by Olympic Games deadline’, South China Morning
Post, 11 May 2007; and Richard McGregor, ‘Beijing claims success for clean air drive’, Financial
Times, 21 August 2007.
102 Martin Zhou, ‘Smog may delay Games events, IOC chief fears’, South China Morning Post, 9 August
2007; and Jonathan Watts, ‘Beijing grounds drivers in bid to clear the air’, Guardian, 17 August 2007.
103 But Beijing officials declared that the test run was a success. McGregor, ‘Beijing claims success for
clean air drive’; and Martin Zhou, ‘Beijing declares its four-day car ban a success’, South China
Morning Post, 22 August 2007. See also Mei Fong, ‘Impact of China’s car curb on smog is unclear’,
Wall Street Journal Online, 20 August 2007, at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB118756097751802209.html, accessed 20 August 2007; and Jonathan Watts, ‘China prays for
Olympic wind as car bans fail to shift Beijing smog’, Guardian, 21 August 2007. An option is,
therefore, to extend the vehicle restrictions plan to the provinces neighbouring Beijing in 2008. Zhou,
‘Beijing declares its four-day car ban a success’.
104 While prospering from outsourcing, multinational corporations are a contributor to China’s growing
environmental hazard by demanding ever-lower prices for Chinese products. Manufacturers in China,
in turn, dump industrial waste into rivers to keep the production cost low. Jane Spencer, ‘Ravaged
rivers: China pays steep price as textile exports boom’,Wall Street Journal Online, 22 August 2007, at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118580938555882301.html, accessed 22 August 2007.
105 Carter & Mol, ‘Domestic and transnational dynamics of a future hegemon’, p 341.
106 Elizabeth Economy, ‘Environmental governance: the emerging economic dimension’, Environmental
Politics, 15 (2), 2006, pp 171 – 189.
107 Seymour, ‘China’s environment: a bibliographic essay’, p 262.
Appendix I












United States 318 739.7 29.20 1096.0
Russia 88 302.1 8.09 610.7
China 85 314.3 7.81 66.2
Germany 78 498.8 7.19 951.0
United Kingdom 67 348.3 6.17 1130.3
Japan 45 197.9 4.14 345.3
France 31 378.3 2.87 522.7
India 24 346.5 2.23 22.9
Ukraine 23 500.1 2.15 491.5
Canada 23 378.2 2.14 739.1
Poland 22 199.8 2.03 581.2
Italy 17 437.2 1.60 302.5
South Africa 12 790.7 1.17 279.1
Australia 11 643.3 1.07 585.9
Mexico 11 052.1 1.01 108.0
Note: China is ranked 91st by measure of per capita cumulative emissions while Luxembourg is ranked
first with 1384.6 tonnes per head.
Source: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT), Version 4.0, Washington, DC: World Resources







































United States 5777.7 22.27 19.9
China 4497.1 17.34 3.5
Russia 1581.0 6.10 10.9
Japan 1258.2 4.85 9.9
India 1148.3 4.43 1.1
Germany 865.1 3.34 10.5
United Kingdom 552.6 2.13 9.3
Canada 543.5 2.10 17.2
South Korea 489.0 1.89 10.2
Italy 468.4 1.81 8.1
Mexico 400.0 1.54 3.9
France 393.9 1.52 6.6
South Africa 382.5 1.47 8.3
Iran 374.2 1.44 5.6
Indonesia 346.8 1.34 1.6
Australia 341.4 1.32 17.2
Spain 335.1 1.29 8.0
Brazil 332.3 1.28 1.8
Saudi Arabia 327.1 1.26 14.0
Ukraine 322.6 1.24 6.7
Poland 311.2 1.20 8.1
Taiwan 261.9 1.01 11.6
Notes: China is ranked 75th by measure of per capita emissions, while Qatar and Kuwait are respectively
ranked first and second, with 44.5 and 26.0 tonnes per head.
A tricky question arises as to which country should bear greater responsibility for cutting carbon dioxide
emissions (and that of other greenhouse gases). If emissions per capita is a good indicator of which country
should take the lead in addressing the looming problem of climate change, then tiny states such as
Luxembourg, Qatar and Kuwait should do more and first. Also, the per capita emissions in Palau (12.3
tonnes) and Nauru (11.4 tonnes), two small island states in the South Pacific, are higher than those of
China. Should they therefore contribute more to cutting greenhouse gases than China? Nauru, a country
with a tiny population, depends very heavily on mining, a polluting industry, for its national income. It
would seem unfair to require a small or a poor country to contribute more to cleaning up the environment.
Does it have the capacity to do so? Also of interest is Australia. As of 2005 Australia was the world’s
largest emitter per capita of greenhouse gases, which include methane belched out by farm animals.
Although some countries are not happy that it refuses to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, few complain that the
country is a large ‘polluter’ in the world. On 3 December 2007 Kevin Rudd signed the instrument of
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in his first act after being sworn in as prime minister of Australia in the
morning. Perhaps a balance should be stuck between absolute amounts of emissions and emissions on a
per capita basis when assessing the responsibility of polluting countries. On this score, the USA should
take a lead as it is a high emitter on both counts. The idea of apportioning responsibility is a complex one
and will remain controversial—an interesting line of enquiry.
Source: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT), Version 4.0, Washington, DC: World Resources
Institute, 2007, at http://cait.wri.org, accessed 2 May 2007.
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